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AModest Minimalism?
Jaan Kangilaski
Department of Philosophy, University of Tartu
My aim in this paper is to present and evaluate one version of the deationary at-
titude to truth, namely the Modest Account, propounded by Wolfgang Künne in
(Künne 2003). I introduce the deationary theories of truth in the rst part of my
paper and present briey the views of a more familiar deationist, Paul Horwich,
as a “stepping-stone” to Künne’s account. In the second part of the paper I give an
overview ofKünne’s theory and in the nal part I present a dilemma that his account
faces: either it is not modest aer all or it is incomprehensible.
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1. Deationism about truth
1.1 Introduction
Weoen say that some sentence or proposition, somebody’s belief or thought
is true (or false). For instance, ‘Tartu is a town’ is a true sentence. ‘Peter
thinks that Tartu is a town’ may be a true or a false sentence, depending on
what Peter thinks, but Peter’s thought that Tartu is a town certainly is true
(if the rst sentence is). What is expressed by that sentence and what is the
content of Peter’s thought (or belief) is usually called a proposition, namely
the proposition that Tartu is a town.
So-called substantive views of truth claim that truth can be explained in
terms of some other property: correspondence, coherence, utility etc. In any
case, truth is supposed to have a nature that can be revealed by analysing the
concept of truth (usually via analysing the truth-predicate). During last 100
years or so, starting with Gottlob Frege, several so-called deationary views
have been put forward in order to deny that truth has any essence or that
it could be analysed in terms of something else. ere are, of course, many
versions of deationism around and thus in some sense this label is not very
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informative (for a recent overview of varieties of deationism, see Stoljar
and Damnjanovic 2007). In fact, Künne advises not to use the term at all,
but I hope that it would not be too confusing to assume, in what follows, that
his position belongs to this broad family of views.
One might try to distinguish varieties of deationism, however. Here is
one way to do this. Some deationary theories claim that truth is not a prop-
erty at all, others admit that it is a property, but quite a trivial one.ose who
belong to the second group can again be divided into two camps: one camp
holds that truth is primarily a property of linguistic items (sentences, state-
ments, utterances), the other camp claims that truth is rst of all a property
of the contents of those linguistic items, i.e. propositions.e theories I shall
be discussing are of the latter kind.1
1.2 Horwich’s minimalism
One of the best-known deationary accounts is Paul Horwich’s, hence I have
chosen his position as a starting point for discussing Künne’s views, which is
the main topic of this essay. According to Horwich’s minimalism (see Hor-
wich 1998), the concept of truth is quite trivial, specically it has no “under-
lying nature” that could or needs to be explicated or analysed. Unlike most
predicates, ‘is true’ is not used to ascribe some usual sort of property to some
entity (e.g. a statement or a belief). Being true is an unanalysable property,
but that does not mean that the truth-predicate could not be dened at all
(although the denition is meant to be only implicit).
e truth-predicate exists, according to Horwich, only because of a cer-
tain logical need.ere are two main uses of it:
1) Oen we want to say something about some proposition, but we do
not know what proposition it is—e.g. we might only know that it is
“what Oscar thinks”. Using the truth-predicate, we may then utter
sentences like ‘What Oscar thinks is true.’
2) Wemaywant to say something about a great number of propositions
at the same time. is can only be done with the help of the truth-
predicate, for instance: ‘Everything Frege said was true’.
For any other need, the truth-predicate is dispensable.
Any declarative sentence p2 is equivalent (presumably in the sense of
necessary equivalence, see Stoljar and Damnjanovic 2007) with a sentence
1 I will thus not enter into the dispute over the question whether propositions are the right
kind of truth-bearers. I shall also not discuss the arguments for and against the deationary
attitude to truth as such.
2 A sentence of English or its translation into any other natural language.
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of the form ‘e proposition that p is true’ (or, alternatively, ‘It is true that p’).
e initial sentence has thus been converted into a noun phrase, the truth-
predicate serves as the “de-nominaliser”, a device for restoring the sentential
structure.
According to Horwich, the minimal theory of truth only contains what
is expressed in the uncontroversial instances (i.e. the instances that do not
lead to semantical paradoxes) of the equivalence schema:
(ES) It is true that p i p.
e remarks about the adequacy of the minimal theory comprise the mini-
malist conception of truth.
e primary truth-bearers for Horwich are propositions, as was said ear-
lier. e predicate ‘is true’ is (implicitly) dened by all uncontroversial in-
stances of the equivalence schema, that is, by all propositions, expressed or
unexpressed (only the paradoxical ones excluded). us, as there is an in-
nity of propositions that are the axioms of the minimal theory, the truth-
denition is innite (seeHalbach 2001 for the claim that the instances of (ES)
are to be regarded as axioms; cf. also Horwich 1998, 43).
In what follows, I shall concentrate on Künne’s theory, introducing it as
being partly in the same business as, but also in important respects dier-
ent from Horwich’s account. I shall not discuss other problems that both
accounts might share.
2. e Modest Account
2.1 Overview and comparison with Horwich
Wolfgang Künne, in his very insightful book Conceptions of Truth (2003),
praises Horwich’s theory, but tries to improve upon it. Künne claims that
in his account he wants to capture a truism about truth shared by ancient
Greeks and many contemporary philosophers, namely that the phrase ‘that
is true’ is interchangeablewith ‘things are as they are said to be’, orwith some-
thing very close to this. But, instead of taking this truism as a “preparatory
step towards more demanding accounts of truth”, Künne proposes to take
this as “a rm resting place” (p. 334).3
At the heart of hisModest Account4 of truth is the schema that is notice-
ably dierent from Horwich’s:
(MOD) ∀x (x is true↔ ∃p (x = [p] & p)).
3 Unless otherwise indicated, all page references are to (Künne 2003).
4 In his most recent writing Künne prefers the title ‘Modest (or Quanticational) Account’,
see Künne (2008).
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is is, according to Künne, “theminimal denition of (propositional) truth”
(p. 337). (e notation ‘[p]’ abbreviates ‘the proposition that p’.) A semi-
formal rendering of (MOD) that is relatively close to the natural language,
is the following:
(mod) ∀x (x is true↔ For some ways things may be said to be, x is the
proposition that things are that way, and things are that way).
(MOD) has several virtues over Horwich’s theory, according to Künne:
(1) instead of consisting of an innity of axioms, it is nitely statable;
(2) unlike the minimal theory, (MOD) is meant to be a generalisation, a
general claim about all truths, thus it tells us what all truths have in common
(cf. Gupta 2005a, 2005b, Halbach 2001 for showing that Horwich’s theory
has problems with such general claims);
(3) it is also conceptually minimal—one of the very problematic features
of Horwich’s theory is that one seems to have to grasp all other concepts rst,
in order to have the concept of truth (see Gupta 1993 for this objection). At
the same time the Modest Account explains ‘true’ in terms of few logical
operators and the concept of a proposition;5
(4) whereas Horwich’s schema does not allow for truth-value gaps (it
would be false for propositions that are neither true nor false), (MOD) allows
them (using two types of negation, see pp. 351–353): it would not be wise,
according to Künne, to commit oneself to the principle of bivalence, if one is
a minimalist, because “a truly modest account of truth and falsity will make
no pretensions to terminate the debate about that principle” (p. 333).
(5) Horwich’s schema has the proviso that it does not cover the paradox-
ical instances, but (MOD) covers these too:
If truth-ascriptions sometimes risk being paradoxical, then no ac-
count of theworkaday concept expressed by the truth-predicatewould
be faithful that did not share this feature: it would be objectionable if
the explanans of ‘true’ were protected against the risk of occasionally
exhibiting paradoxical features (p. 350).
What to make of this? It might be a virtue or a vice, depending on one’s
attitude to the issue. If one wants to give a theory of truth where the every-
day notion of truth is somehow made more precise, this would not do. But
Künnewants precisely to elucidate the everyday notion, to give “a connective
analysis” of it in the style of Strawson (cf. Künne 2008), thus if the notion of
truth is in fact paradoxical, the account of it should not explain this feature
away.
5 at is why truth is only a “broadly logical” property, according to Künne, because the
notion of proposition is itself not a logical concept (see Künne 2008).
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(6) the instances of (Den)6 are all derivable from (MOD), thus Künne’s
account explains all that is explained byHorwich’s minimalism—but not the
other way round. According toKünne, this amounts to saying that (MOD) is
more fundamental than the axioms of the minimal theory (cf. pp. 353–355).
Recently Künne has stressed, however, that he should not be misunderstood
as claiming that the condition of adequacy of his account is that it entails all
the instances of (Den) (see Künne 2005, 565).
2.2 Propositional quantication?
A peculiar feature one can at once notice when looking at (MOD) is that
there are two kinds of quantiers that are used in it.e universal quantier
ranges over thewhole domain, but the existential quantier is restricted only
to propositions. In what follows, only the latter will interest us.
As Künne admits, many would claim that (MOD) is either incompre-
hensible or circular (pp. 356). Why is that?e existential quantication in
(MOD) is sentential, i.e. the variable p is a place-holder for sentences. Circu-
larity would follow if we would construe the quantication substitutionally,
because the most usual way of interpreting this is with using the concept of
truth. Or else one has to worry about what Künne calls the Argument from
Conceptual Overloading.7 If, on the other hand, we construe the existential
quantier objectually, then (MOD) would be unintelligible, because the last
occurrence of the variable p is in the sentence, not in the singular-term posi-
tion (e.g. Donald Davidson has for a long time objected to similar accounts
along these lines, see Davidson 2001, 2005).
Künne proposes instead to read the quantication on the right-hand side
of (MOD) as being an objectual quantication over propositions (pp. 360).8
For this to be intelligible, he rightly claims, one should widen the notion of
objectual quantication to cover not only quantication into singular-term
positions, but also into general-term and sentence positions. e permissi-
6 Künne uses the phrase “the Denominalization Schema”, abbreviated as (Den), for Hor-
wich’s (ES).
7 Discussing Hartry Field’s proposal to interpret substitutional existential quantiers as ab-
breviating innite disjunctions, Künne says: “If ‘is true’ abbreviates that innite disjunc-
tion, then you cannot have the concept of truth without having, inter alia, all concepts
expressible in English. Nobody has all these concepts, but every competent speaker of
English understands ‘is true’” (p. 359).
8 In his bookKünne calls this a “higher-order quantication” but aer criticism from several
reviewers of his book he has later abandoned this label as misleading. As Marian David
puts it: in second-order quantication variables range over sets or properties, in third-
order quantication over sets or properties of those sets or properties etc. e sentential
quantication does not fall anywhere in this hierarchy. See (David 2005, Künne forthcom-
ing).
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ble substituends for ‘p’ express their values, instead of designating them.
As a support for this broader understanding of objectual quantication,
Künne provides the idioms in natural language: ‘ings are thus’, ‘is is
how things are’, ‘ings are that way’ or, in German, ‘Es verhält sich so’.us
the rendering of ‘∃p (. . . p . . . )’ as ‘For some way things may be said to be
. . . things are that way’ (p. 364).
Assuming that one agrees with what was just said, there still remains the
oddity of quantifying in two dierent styles at once, the nominal variable
‘x’ and the sentential variable ‘p’ in (MOD) having the same range. In his
explanation of this, Künnemakes use of the analogy with two ways in which
we can introduce a property into an atomic sentence: e.g. both the predicate
‘is wise’ and the noun ‘wisdom’ can be used to do this. e rst expression
signies the property wisdom, the other designates it. Only the rst one
exists exclusively for this purpose: ourmastering of the secondmode is based
on our comprehension of the rstmode. Sometimeswe use these twomodes
in one sentence, as in this example by Künne, somewhat modied:
Ben is wise, and that is a good quality in a teacher.
To the two ways of introducing properties into discourse there correspond
two ways of quantifying over properties, nominal and predicative.
Exactly the same thing holds for propositions, Künne claims. One can in-
troduce a proposition into the discourse either by a sentence that expresses it
(primarymode) or by a singular term that refers to it (can be grasped only on
the basis of the rst way). And we can thus also quantify over propositions
in those two ways, e.g.:
1) However the oracle says things are, thus they are. (Sentential style.)
2) Whatever the oracle says is true. (Nominal style.)
In (MOD) we just use the two ways of quantication in one sentence. I con-
cur with Künne in being unable to see any problemwith it (see pp. 365–368).
Onemightmake the following objection to the existential quantication
in (MOD) (see David 2005). Taking ‘x’ to be ‘the Pythagorean eorem’,
Künne claims (p. 363) that a proposition satises the condition expressed by
‘the Pythagoreaneorem= the proposition that p& p’ i it is identical with
the Pythagoreaneorem and true. But from (MOD) it should rather come
out as: i the proposition that it is identical with the Pythagoreaneorem
and true, but this is nonsense. Künne suppresses the phrase ‘the proposition
that’ when stating when the condition is satised.is makes it meaningful,
but is not justied.
I think that Künne might reply along the following lines: the objection
does not take into account the dierence between expressing a proposition
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and referring to a proposition. A sentence ‘p’ expresses a proposition, the
nominalisation ‘the proposition that p’ (or formally [p]) refers to the same
proposition. In ‘the Pythagoreaneorem = the proposition that p & p’ we
have rst the nominalisation that is said to have the same reference as the
expression ‘the Pythagorean eorem’, and secondly we have the sentence
that expresses the very same proposition. Now, when laying down that a
proposition satises the condition expressed by ‘the Pythagoreaneorem
= the proposition that p& p’ i it is identical with the Pythagoreaneorem
and true, we are talking about a proposition, i.e. referring to it, thus also
ascribing truth to it. In otherwords, in giving the condition, we are talking so
to say with the help of the sentential var iables, but when talking about when
a proposition satises the condition, we aremaking use of the usual, nominal
quantication. And thus the words ‘the proposition that’ are superuous.9
3. A dilemma for Künne
In its essence, Künne’s account appears quite compelling.ere is, however,
an objection to the quantication in (MOD) that I take to be a rather serious
obstacle forKünne.10 One can present it in the formof a dilemma forKünne’s
characterisation of propositional quantication. Either one loses modesty,
or (MOD) is incomprehensible.
As we saw, the characterisation above of when a proposition satises the
condition expressed by ‘the Pythagoreaneorem = the proposition that p
& p’ uses the notion of truth. is raises the question whether there is not
a circularity involved. Künne recognises this problem and says that here he
is giving a meta-level characterisation of a formal symbol, not an ordinary-
language counterpart of it. Consider an analogy: ‘∃x (x is a dog)’ is explained
by saying that it is true when there is an object that is a dog; here we are also
not translating the formula into natural language, but characterise it on the
meta-level.is is, however, acceptable only insofar as there is an intelligible
and noncircular reading of (MOD) available in natural language. But is there
9 ere is another, more general worry that can also be overcome, I believe: How to justify
that we can formalise our truth talk in two ways, e.g. ‘Everything he says is true’ as ‘∀x
(he says x → x is true)’, and as ‘∀p (he says that p → that p is true)’? How are the two
translations related to each other and to the natural language original?
As said above, Künne addresses this with the analogy with the two ways for introducing a
property into discourse. Analogously, a proposition can both be expressed and denoted.
Of course, the exact relationship between those two formalisations is an interesting issue
in its own right. In fact, Künne has, especially in his more recent work, written quite much
towards illuminating this issue that to my mind amounts to the justication asked for (see
Künne 2005, 2008). So I am inclined to say that no further justication for formalising
truth talk in those two ways is needed.
10 is objection was rst presented by Marian David, see (David 2005).
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such a reading? As Marian David puts it:
Variables of rst-order objectual quantication occupy noun posi-
tions and function like ordinary-language pronouns.e variables of
the ‘∃p’-quantication in the MOD-formula take sentence positions
and are supposed to function like prosentences. (David 2005, 189)
Even if there in fact are prosentences11 in the natural languages, the exis-
tence of phrases like ‘things are that way’ in itself does not guarantee that
they function like genuine, i.e. quanticational prosentences (not just pros-
entences of laziness), and in particular that there are natural-language quan-
tiers that bind them. But Künne claims that ‘For some ways things may be
said to be’ is such a quantier.
Here one can see a problem:Künne’s reading of ‘∃p’ invokes “ways things
may be said to be”, thuswe are quantifying overways, i.e. over states of aairs.
But is not this already very close to the fact-based correspondence theory?12
at certainly would not be good news for a modest theory of truth.
Answering to critics, Künne later reformulates this (see Künne 2008).
His new natural-language reading of the right-hand side of (MOD) is:
x is the proposition that things are a certain way, and things are that
way.
But now there is no explicit existential quantication in the natural-language
counterpart. And as far as I can see, it is quite dicult to nd something
that would not look like quantication over facts or similar entities. (For the
universal propositional quantication Künne later uses the phrase ‘However
she says things are, thus they are’, see Künne 2008.)
us, perhaps Künne can indeed silence the worry of being commit-
ted to states of aairs that his earlier account faced—and thus escape one
horn of the dilemma—, but this cannot be a solution, because now we can
say that as there is aer all no natural-language equivalent to ‘∃p’, the ac-
count is circular and unintelligible. We are thus led to the other horn of the
dilemma. Künne has still to show that the dilemma can be dissolved—that
his Modest or Quanticational Account of truth can be given a non-circular
semi-formal characterisation.
11 A prosentence is supposed to be an expression that refers anaphorically to a previous use
of a sentence, analogously to the functioning of anaphoric pronouns.
12 Künne criticises this and other versions of the correspondence theory at length in Chapter
3 of his book.
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4. Conclusion
I have tried to show that although some of the objections to the treatment of
quantication in Künne’s Modest Account of truth can be overcome, there
remains at least one problem with it that Künne has not as yet been able to
counter. It consists in the fact that there seems to be no natural-language
equivalent to the propositional quantier ‘∃p’, thus the account given by
(MOD) is circular.
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